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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner 
v. 
DAVID R. WARDEN, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the decision of the Court of Appeals in this 
matter in conflict with earlier decisions of the Court of 
Appeals, namely, State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422 (1989), holding 
that the existence of contrary evidence or of conflicting 
inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict. See 
also Steele v. Breinholt. 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
2. Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is in 
conflict with the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, namely, 
State v. Gardner. 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1989), holding 
that "...where there is any evidence, including reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of all 
the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, 
our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict." See 
also State v. McClain. 706 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah 1985). 
1 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Warden, 
122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, P.2d (Ct. App. 1989), appears as 
Appendix A to this petition. A copy of that court's order 
denying the State's petition for rehearing appears as Appendix B. 
JURISDICTION 
The lower court's opinion was filed on November 22, 1989 
(Appendix A). On January 29, 1990, an order denying the State's 
petition for rehearing was issued (Appendix B). The State's 
petition for rehearing tolled the period in which this petition 
for certiorari had to be filed, R. Utah S. Ct. 45(c); therefore, 
the petition is timely filed. This court has jurisdiction to 
review the decision of the Court of Appeals by a writ of 
certiorari under UTAH CODE ANN. 78-2-2(5) (Supp.1986). 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. Section 76-2-103(4) 
Definition of "criminal negligence or criminally 
negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
* * * 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint. 
2 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. Section 76-5-206 
Negligent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if 
the actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes 
the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David R. Warden, was charged with Negligent 
Homicide, a class A misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-206 
(1973). The defendant was was initially tried by jury in the 
Second Circuit Court, Layton Department, beginning on November 
16, 1987; however, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18, 
1987 due to improper testimony given by one of the State's 
witnesses. A second jury trial was held beginning February 22, 
1988, which continued through February 26, 1988. Defendant was 
convicted of the offense of Negligent Homicide as charged. 
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals and on 
November 22, 1989, the Court ruled by written opinion that the 
conviction should be reversed on the basis of insufficiency of 
the evidence, based upon the State's failure to establish a 
"substantial and unjustifiable risk of death." 
The State's petition for rehearing was denied without 
comment (Appendix B). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RULING OF THIS PANEL OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF OTHER 
PANELS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THAT IT 
WEIGHED EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT 
WHICH WAS CONTROVERTED BY OTHER COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
3 
The Court of Appeals opinion properly cites State v. 
Tolman, 775 P.2d 422 (Utah 1989) as a standard for review, but 
fails to recognize the rule regarding conflicting evidence: 
Although contrary evidence was presented, 
"(t)he existence of contradictory evidence or 
conflicting inferences does not warrant 
disturbing the jury's verdict." Tolman at 424, 
425. 
That rule has been consistently recognized by other 
panels of the Court of Appeals. See Steele v. Breinholt. supra, 
at 436; State v. Arrovo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Court of Appeals opinion, in reversing on the issue 
of sufficiency of the evidence, summarized the evidence in five 
paragraphs. Nearly all of the evidence relied upon by the court 
was contradicted in the evidence presented. Those five 
paragraphs are reproduced below along with examples of the 
contradictory testimony: 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
Defendant testified at trial 
that the grandparents weighed 
the newborn baby and 
determined it to be about five 
pounds. 
Defendant also said 
he believed the baby to be two 
to three weeks premature. 
EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT 
Dr. Sweeney, State Medical 
Examiner: 
A: 1.86 kilograms, 2,2 pounds 
per kilogram off the top of my 
head that would be about four 
pounds, but I don't have a 
calculator. 
The Court: I get 4.092 
working it out here at the 
bench. 
The witness: So it would be 
about four pounds one ounce, 
approximately. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.15 
Dr. Sweeney, State Medical 
Examiner: 
Q: Did you come to a 
conclusion as to how long it 
had been in the uterus prior 
to birth? 
A: I «tii'li-
es What was that conclusion? 
A: That it was consistent 
with approximately 33 to 34 
weeks with 40 normally being 
the number that I s used for 
full term. 
T.Vol.Ill, p. 7 
Dr• Kramer, State# s 
Pediatrician: 
Q: When you d :i d that 
measurement, what conclusi on 
did you come to? 
A: Based on weight, hei gh t 
and head circumference, the 
baby was 33 or 3 4 weeks of 
gestation, which means the 
baby was probably six to seven 
weeks early. 
Defendant was aware that the 
baby was having "grunting 
reparations," which he said 
was a sign of early 
respiratory distress syndrome. 
Defendant positioned the 
baby in such a way that the 
labored breathing was 
relieved. 
Dr. < -
Q: Is it possible to adjust 
the position of the baby so as 
to eliminate the grunting 
sound? 
A: Yes, And tha t's 
irrelevant to me because the 
baby could be face down and 
the noise could be muffled. 
There's many ways that we can 
change the noise coming out. 
That's not relevant to me. 
Q: Does the changing of the 
noise change the exertion of 
the baby? 
A: No, 
Q: Does it change the 
progress of the disease? 
A: No, 
Q: Does it have any 
physiologic effect whatsoever 
with regard to the disease? 
A: No, 
T i fn] II II 
He £i irther testified that 
the severity of the 
respiratory distress did not 
indicate a need for 
hospitalization. 
He said that he informed Ivy 
Dr, Kraiic? i; 
Qi Now, in tins particul ar 
case, I tiiiriJi you recognized 
that the baby was born at the 
home of the Youngs and then 
after the birth of the baby 
that the baby was premature 
and had difficulty breathing, 
but that the baby was then 
stable. 
He instructed Ivy to call 
him if there was any change 
and admitted that he was 
depending on Ivy to carefully 
Before leaving the Young 
residence, defendant noted the 
respiratory difficulty had 
subsided. 
He stated, "The baby was 
respiring well, the baby was 
still awake and alert and 
muscle tone was still good." 
He also said, "I was 
impressed that the baby had 
already shown some signs of 
respiratory distress syndrome, 
but under similar 
circumstances in the past, I 
have left babies at home, 
having instructed the mother 
on how to nurse, having 
instructed the mother to keep 
the baby warm and therefore I 
felt I could leave, confident 
that grandma would call m£, 
confident that if there were 
any progression of symptoms 
was left at the home of the 
Youngs for a time? 
A: That's what I was told. 
Q: And I understand that you 
feel that that is 
inappropriate because the baby 
should have been placed in the 
hospital? That's your 
conclusion? 
As That's my opinion. 
T. Vol.11, pp.289-290 
Ivy Young: 
A: He told me to watch the 
baby through the night. 
Q: He said watch the baby 
through the night? 
A: (witness nods) 
Q: Anything else? 
A: No. He didn't tell me 
what to watch for. He just 
said to watch the baby. 
Q: Did he say anything to you 
if any problem arose or 
anything of this sort? 
A: No. 
Q: Didn't say, "Call me if 
there's a problem."? 
A: No. 
T. Vol. I, pp.85-86 
Dr. Chan 
A: A baby who is born at 33, 
34 weeks gestation at 
approximately four pounds, 
which I think is less than two 
kilos, 2,000 grams — 
Q: yes. 
A: —would certainly be 
admitted to a newborn 
intensive care unit. that 
baby is at high risk for, one, 
developing respiratory 
problems, such as hyaline 
membrane disease, second, 
metabolic problems like low 
sugar, electrolyte problems 
and also anemia or infection. 
T. Vol.Ill, pp.239-240 
Ivy Young: 
Q: All right. Now, at that 
time (just as the Dr. left) 
did you note the breathing? 
tha 1: I would be called. 
Defendant later testified 
that of 300 home births he had 
attended, approximately ten of 
those babies had been 
premature. 
Eight of those had no 
repiratory distress, but 
defendant said that he had 
hospitalized onl y three of 
those eight. 
In the case of this infant, 
defendant testified that f,in 
my experience and the judgment 
that 1 applied at the time 
based on experience with 
babies who are even smaller 
that this delivered at home, 
they can in many cases get 
along very, very well..." 
A: It still stayed the same. 
It was the same noise then the 
baby would quit the noise and 
kind of rest for a while. 
Q: So what you heard was a 
grunting sound and then it 
seemed like it would rest for 
a while? 
A: Yes, 
Q: Could you detect in those 
rest periods whether or not 
the baby was breathing? 
A: He seemed to be. It was 
just kind of a very short 
period, Each time I checked 
that he was okay and I turned 
him to the other side and then 
he'd start grunting again, 
Q: How often would he 
this grunting sound? 
A: He was just making trie 
grunting sound all the i-^ «-
T Vol 1, p.88 
Dr. Kramer, Sta t€ s 
Pediatrician: 
A: I'm not sure whether Dr. 
Warden had the confidence of 
the parents to watch this 
baby, 1# m not sure what 
happened, but I bel ieve, if 1 
can explain this, 1 believe 
that parents or grandparents 
are not i n the position to 
evaluate a baby's situation 
where the baby is, in mj 
opinion, premature. 
T.Vol.II, p.293 
The State's expert medical 
witness testified that 
although the mother and baby 
"would dc better" in a 
hospital, defendant's 
evaluation of the infant's 
well being would indicate that 
the baby's vital signs were 
"acceptable " ' 
Dr chan: 
Q: Would the high Apgar score 
to you indicate that it is not 
a high ri sk baby? 
AI No. 
Q: Would that baby still be, 
in your opj ni on,, a high risk 
baby? 
I : Yes. 
T ' 255 
Dr. Kramer: 
Q: My previous question was 
couched in terms of otherwise 
They conceded that the 
infant may have survived had 
he been hospitalized up to ten 
hours after birth, but 
believed that leaving the baby 
at home was "bad judgment" on 
defendant's part. 
The State's neonatologist 
testified that hyaline 
membrane disease is a 
progressive disease. 
He also indicated that a 
baby in the condition of the 
deceased is typically "at high 
risk for medical and surgical 
problems." 
As far as mortality for an 
infant with the disease, 
however, he stated that the 
failure to provide therapy 
would only place the 
probability of death at five 
to fifteen percent. 
He later stated upon cross 
examination that statistically 
only two percent of babies die 
from untreated hyaline 
membrane disease. 
He further said, "I guess 
the message is it's very 
unusual and rare to lose a 
baby at this gestation and 
this birth weight from hyaline 
membrane disease." 
Asked whether it would be 
outside the medical standard 
of care to have the family of 
a home delivered newborn to 
monitor any changes in the 
baby's condition, the 
neonatologist believed it was, 
healthy. Changing that 
hypothetical just somewhat to 
say that the child had those 
same physical dimensions but 
had an acceptable eight, nine, 
or ten Apgar score, would that 
child be considered a healthy 
child? 
A: No. 
T.Vol.II, pp.278,279 
Dr. Kramer: 
Q: Can you comment on the 
probability of saving the 
child at 8 o'clock? 
A: I don't know, the earlier 
the better. 
T.Vol.II, pp.307-308 
Dr. Chan: 
Q: With that scenario where 
the baby was about four 
pounds, 33 to 34 weeks in 
gestation, about ten hours 
old, blue and with a lowered 
heart rate and respiration, 
would you expect to be able to 
save the baby? 
A: I would hope so, but I 
would have my doubts. 
T. Vol.Ill, p.247 
Dr. Chan: 
Q: How much would the 
probability of life for that 
child be decreased by the 
failure to provide therapy? 
A: Failure to provide therapy 
for a baby at 33, 34 weeks 
gestation who has developed 
hyaline membrane disease, I 
think your extent of 
mortality, instead of less 
than one percent, you move 
into five, ten, fifteen 
percent. 
T.Vol.Ill, p.250 
but conceded that 
competent physicians 
dl sagree wi th him, 
other 
would 
The State's experts DL . "'• 11«=*11: 
testified that the medical A: That's to 
community in this state does approach to m e problem 
not teach or train physicians because it does occur and I 
for home delivery and think home deliveries are 
generally recommends against appropriate in many 
it. circumstances. 
T. Vol.111, p,266 
The court misapprehend • I I li \A a t eiiieiiil I I li i i J 11 i 
regarding the '•statistic" that only two percent of babies die of 
untreated hyaline membrane disease, 
it could b e — i t doesn't matter where it is, 1 
suggest The bottom, line is that the child is 
untreated; therefore, if you have hyaline 
membrane f 33 to 34 weeks and it's untreated 
percent, two-out of a hundred may die? 
A. We're not talking apples and
 o r a ng e s # 
If the baby is in the hospital and it's — 
see, there's no study where you say this baby 
will be treated and this baby will not be 
treated. I'm giving you the statistics of all 
babies in the hospital being watched and 
there's some babies you watch carefully and 
they don't need any treatment, don't require 
any treatment, and those babies -- and if you 
say yes, if you're looking at those babies 
that are not treated, very few of them will 
die. (T.Vol.III, p.260) 
It would be both unethical and inhumane to do a study in 
a h o s t . i i t d i l i i i iiillliii li ip.it i P i i l ^ I'^llii ,ih i t i iiin'i ' ly ioniptoms r e q u i r i n g 
therapy are divided nttu two qioups: mi which will be treated 
and one which will not, The statistics quoted by the witness 
W P M f u r p i l l i i i P i i l ' n h i i "ml if in I l i I-"" in iii"111" mi that in f hi-" 
op i JI L on of the i r physic i anb . hcrrapy was not required» Under 
those circumstances, very few will die. 
Further, on re-direct the witness clarified his 
position: 
Q: Now, we've had some talk about 
percentages and it's a little bit confusing, 
so I just want to recap a bit. From the point 
of view of the doctor, leaving the home 30 
minutes after the birth of the baby, given the 
factors that the baby is 33 to 34 weeks in 
gestation, that it's four pounds, that it's 
got some blueness in its extremities and that 
it's making the grunting sounds, what can you 
say about that baby? 
A. That baby had respiratory distress 
syndrome. That baby is having respiratory 
problems. That baby is sick. 
Q. All right. Now, do you say anything 
with regard to the probability of its dying 
from that disease if it's untreated or left in 
the care of a lay person? 
A. I think to leave a baby with hyaline 
membrane disease with a lay person just 
creates increased problems of mortality for 
that baby, morbidity. 
Q. Can you give us any kind of a 
quantitative objective basis that we can 
develop as to what the degree of risk there is 
for that baby left in the care of a lay 
person? 
A. It is very high. You could say 10, 
20-20 times higher when left to a lay person 
to manage the baby (T.Vol.Ill, p.278-279). 
In any event, the determination of criminal negligence 
should not be established by percentages of morbidity. It is to 
be determined by a subjective standard rather than an objective 
standard. State v. Ruben. 663 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983). 
The Court cites caselaw dealing with "bad judgment" by a 
physician. State v. Warden, supra. at 45. The case now before 
this Court is factually more consistent with the Montana case of 
State v. Hoffman. 639 P.2d 567 (Montana 1982), where a mother was 
found guilty of negligent homicide for failure to provide medical 
10 
f, r t » a t H I P ' > i i ' 11 I'• -i" '' "i'11*-• ^ n i l «*-»'" i 111 i in " i""« i" i [' i"'j v j (.11,-1 m e e t 1 t ; a i 
treatment is aeajt. v;:n ir. Horni ide- ..,^ ck of Medical Attention, 
100 A.L.R,2d 483 (1965)-
nor authorized to provide u - treatment wnioh *ould have ^ V P C 
this infant's 1 ife, h i ^  1utv m r ^ e r.i,,(-0^ -«sembles that t a 
pares <»i" cif her per soi I '« :i t::l:i a coi itr ac tuaJ duty «::>f c a r e
 i(l t
r
 = n n f" 11d t, 
of a physician fully qualified and authorized to treat. 
A reasonable jury con] d have concluded that an i n c r e a s e ci 
] in e s :i s a s u b s t a n t i a 1 r i s k, 
POINT II. 
THE RULING Ok' THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT IN THAT THE COURT LOOKED BEYOND THE 
EVIDENCE MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY VERDICT. 
A y a 111, ii, e v i e w i n q t n e o p i n i o i" " i: 111 e t: a u r t o t App e a 1 s, 
the court cites evidence favorable to the defendant. The Utah) 
Supreme Court has consistently ruled thai ti'io standard for review 
of .1 jury vetdi* "I is I n h ul' I I he e< idence favorable to the 
jury verdict to test it's sufficiency. 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
crediblIity of the witnesses...." State v. 
Lamm. 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980); accord 
State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1364# 1366 (Utah 
1983). " 
So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. State 
v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 at 345 (Utah 1985). 
See also, State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 10 (Utah 1989), State v. McClain. 706 P.2d 
603, 607 (Utah ] 9 8 5 ) • 
The Court of Appeals7 opinion indicates that it failed 
to adhere to that standard in the instant case: 
Thus, reasonable minds could examine the 
evidence presented and entertain a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted. Warden, at p. 45. 
(emphasis added) 
That statement is clearly not the standard established 
by the cases cited. Under the established standard, the court 
should only overturn the conviction if "...reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
The court further misapplied the standard of review in 
its assessment of the evidence: 
This response merely reinforces our conclusion 
that his testimony, as well as that of the 
other experts for the State, must be construed 
in light of the fact that home delivery, 
though legal, is not a widespread practice by 
doctors in Utah. Warden, at p. 45. (emphasis 
added). 
By making that conclusion, the court has removed from 
the jury the function of assessing the weight of the evidence. 
To establish criminal negligence, it is 
necessary to show conduct which is %a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint.'...It is therefore a subjective 
element requiring consideration of all 
relevant circumstances surrounding the 
incident. State v. Ruben, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in State v. Bolsinger 
699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), that a jury could take into account 
several factors in evaluating conduct: 
In Neitzel, supra, the court enumerated four 
determining factors a jury should be asked 
when it evaluates conduct resulting in death 
and alleged to be depraved indifference: (1) 
the utility of the defendant's conduct, (2) 
the magnitude of the r:i sk, (3) the defendant's 
knowledge of the risk, (4) any precautions 
taken by the defendant to minimize the risk. 
Bolsinger at 1220, referring to Neitzel v. 
State, 655 P,?^ "*" 'Alaska App 198?* 
The jury was entitled to assess each of the above 
facr i 1 at i r * i - <-.
 |i:. 
detenc.i , v* ;... ., ,.^ H**^  . . ,o«, . ^uvuld not reverse 
the jury's eonclusi or:- I:,<OL^ r finds there 1,- ?"" • idence to 
sarr . * M S -. re] U S [ »-»r 
... . .<~rt.* . 1 S 
undisputed that the family requested a home delivery and that 
there is some social iitill ty to the practice nf home birth The 
question is what social utility was there in Ipdwin<| J a ret h Vuung 
in his diseased condition to t ti«j care of Ivy V'oung, an 
inexperienced lay person Vhe |ury was entitled to acrppt the 
t e sr i :i- 111 I v y it www \ I I i. 11 I 111 i II e t. e n 11 d J 11 J e 1 L I  n i ' i \\l i I II 1 1 
instructions as to what to watch for and that Ivy Young asked the 
defendant i* the victim ouqht not be hospitalized, The iutv 
f L l l * Ut- : | n i l I i. J U P S t I ( H I I III I I I 1 I I I V I ' I !•"• t » 'I H J L I J I I I " « f 1 I I II 
to diligently attend his patients before dtid rillni delivery, 
The jury should further be able to assess the social 
uti 1 Ity ui pi act ic i nq hum-" ' ' * " "4 J: ,J ,!" ' " mi i i nil ri i n 11 
malpractice insurance and not being authorized * I;:L' patients 
2 MAGNITUDE OF THF U ^ '"•* ' ^ r ^ M p ,.<= the risk 
can best be assessed Iby t. i- /» J* . . deatn 
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increased by defendant's decision to leave the victim in the care 
of the grandmother, Ivy Young. Dr. Chan testified that so doing 
increased the probability of death ten to twenty times. 
The single most important factor in determining the 
nature and magnitude of the risk is the fact that Hyaline 
Membrane Disease is a progressive disease. That is, given all 
infants of this gestational age who contract the disease, five to 
fifteen percent can be expected to die without medical 
intervention. The probability of death increases as the disease 
progresses. The experts agreed that as medical intervention 
became necessary, time became an increasingly important factor. 
3: THE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK. Defendant 
acknowledged on the witness stand that he had diagnosed the 
disease, that he was aware that it was progressive in nature and 
that it was potentially fatal (T.Vol.IV, p.176). He had even 
made the determination that the baby would be better off in the 
hospital (T.Vol.IV, p.174). Sharon Johnson asked Defendant if 
the child shouldn't be hospitalized but he told her it wouldn't 
be necessary (T.Vol.IV, p.126). 
4. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO MINIMIZE THE 
RISK. Emphasis has been placed by both the State and the 
Defendant upon the decision to leave the victim in the care of 
the grandmother, a lay person. That act alone, however, is not 
the only act for which Defendant should be held accountable. 
Consideration should be given to the immediate prenatal care or 
lack thereof, and the total absence of a reasonable course of 
14 
to 1 1 ow-np (vi t (i a f 1' pr I It*1 h i r t h " 
the .'ourt stated: 
The standard of care to be applied in 
this case is that which is applicable to a 
physician practicing general medicine in 
connection with the pregnancy, labor, deli^er^ 
and aftercare of a mother and newborn i-if-i 
in the circumstances of this case. (P • ^ 
53) 
Tin-1 l)e fendait) I IViib'il I in i rt i m i /<» I lie m isks Midt existed 
early in the day prior to delivery. He failed In minimize the 
risks at thp f ^  me of delivery and t-hpn a H e r diagnosing the 
disease i nil m n 1.1111 AV the a"; I lie <J isease 
progressed.. 
POINT III, 
T H E R E I S S U F F I C I E N T E V I D E N C E T 0 S H 0 W A 
SUBSTANTIAL AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK OF DEATH BY 
VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT, 
The standard that should have been appl ied by the Court 
of Appeals ]^ enunciates «.- State v. BMG Corporation. 700 p.2d 
1 -•• • --.ah inB'V) i 
To mount a successful attack on the trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshal1 all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then demonstrate 
that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. 
BMG Corp., at 1070. 
Marshalling the evidence .is case i n the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, the following inferences can be 
drawn: 
1
 Oefeadapt- v*«- » 1 icensed physician who had 
maintained -* family practice since 1968, including obstetrical 
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2. Defendant assumed responsibility for the infant's 
physical well-being by agreeing to deliver it at home; 
3. Defendant did not insist on examining the mother 
when she reported vaginal bleeding to determine if premature 
birth was likely; 
4. Defendant knew that the established due date was 
several weeks off, yet he failed to personally attend the 
patient, a fact the defendant admitted on the witness stand was 
an error in judgment (T.Vol.IV, pp.153,163); 
5. Defendant knew that the local practice was not to 
have babies delivered at the local hospital if the gestation 
period is less than 35 weeks, but rather to deliver in a more 
specialized hospital (T.Vol.II, p.281); 
6. Defendant could have minimized the risk of premature 
birth by Tocolysis (T.Vol.Ill, p.179); 
7. The practice of referring a mother in premature 
labor to a hospital for Tocolysis is within the standard of care 
for physicians practicing home births and for this doctor 
personally (T.Vol.IV, p.131); 
8. Defendant could have slowed the onset of labor by 
methods available in a homebirth setting (T.Vol.IV, p.131); 
9. Defendant could then have had the baby delivered in 
a hospital setting, as would have been his own normal practice 
even under these conditions, since he would not normally deliver 
a premature baby in a home (T.Vol.IV, p.149); 
10. Defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as having 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome and had actual knowledge of the 
16 
risk of death posed by the disease, that it was progressive in 
nature, the techniques available for monitoring the progress of 
the disease by electronic equipment, and the treatments available 
in Class III hospital neonatal units (T.Vol.IV, pp.175-178); 
11. Defendant could have immediately hospitalized the 
baby, but did not; 
12. Defendant could have remained longer in the home 
himself, but did not; 
13. Defendant could have arranged for a nurse or other 
trained professional to monitor the progress of the disease, but 
did not; 
14. Defendant could have provided Ivy Young with a 
specific list of symptoms with an objective standard for 
observation, but did not; 
15. Defendant could have provided Ivy Young with a 
protocol for action more thorough than to just call him; 
16. Defendant advised the family to position the baby 
in a way which relieved the symptoms but would not alleviate the 
condition itself, but would rather mask the indicators of the 
progress of the disease; 
17. Defendant minimized the seriousness of the infant's 
condition to both Sharon and Ivy, and never advised anyone that 
the child could die from the disease (T.Vol.IV, p.132); 
18. The practice of hospitalizing an infant with the 
disease was within the standards of the defendant's practice and, 
indeed, he had hospitalized three of eight children he had 
delivered at home with the disease (T.Vol.IV, p.132); 
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19. The defendant was not authorized to hospitalize 
this infant because he had no malpractice insurance, so would 
have to call another physician or have the infant admitted 
through an emergency room facility, which would cause him some 
embarrassment (T.Vol.IV, pp.121-122,124,126,127); 
20. Defendant left the infant in the care of a lay 
person, the grandmother, with instructions only to watch the 
infant through the night, without any specific instructions as to 
what to watch for (T.Vol.I, p.86); 
21. Defendant consistently, from the early stages of 
labor through the time he left the child, assured the family that 
the conditions they were concerned about were normal, that 
hospitalization was unnecessary, and that Ivy should "stop 
fussing" (T.Vol.I, p.66; Vol.Ill, p.93,94,102) ; 
22. Defendant knew that the disease was progressive and 
that the probability of survival decreased as the disease 
progressed, yet he failed to call on the Youngs until noon the 
next day (T.Vol.IV, p.Ill); 
23. The defendant lives less than five blocks from the 
Young residence (T.Vol.IV, p.162). His office is six to eight 
blocks from the Young residence (T.Vol.IV, p.158). He had ample 
opportunity to visit or call upon the Youngs, but did not; 
24. At approximately six and a half hours after the 
birth, defendant was awake, reading National Geographic 
(T.Vol.IV, p.105); 
25. Defendant remained at home for some time before 
leaving to play racquetball at a club which did not open until 
eight and a half hours after the birth (T.Vol.IV, p.105); 
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26. Had the defendant called on the Youngs at that 
time, he would have learned that Jareth was continuing in the 
grunting sounds and had an abnormal color (T.Vol.I, p.91); 
27. Defendant returned from racquetball to his office 
approximately ten hours after the birth (T.Vol.IV, p.107). Had 
he checked with the Youngs at that time, the defendant would have 
learned that the baby had, at one time, stopped breathing 
(T.Vol.I, p.94) and that Ivy Young was trying to contact him; 
28. A layperson could not be expected to recognize the 
subtle changes in the progress of the disease (T.Vol.Ill, 
pp.272,273); 
29. Jareth Young died from Respiratory Distress 
Syndrome (T.Vol.Ill, p.13); 
30. By leaving the child in the care of laypersons, the 
risk of death increased 10 to 20 times - from less than one 
percent to up to fifteen percent (T.Vol.Ill, pp.278,279); and 
31. The death was preventable by hospitalization within 
a 99% degree of certainty, a fact known to the defendant 
(T.Vol.Ill, p.248). 
These inferences are sufficient to sustain the verdict 
of the jury. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has found the 
evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of criminal negligence 
in death cases involving less probability of death. See 
State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980), wherein the court 
found sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of negligent 
homicide where defendant, acting as an accomplice, bent down a 
19 
stop sign so it was not visible from the lane of travel; also, 
State v, McPhee. 684 P.2d 57 (Utah 1984), where the evidence in 
an automobile homicide consisted of evidence of drinking, a state 
of intoxication so as to cause staggering and slurred speech and 
evidence of crossing three lanes of travel into the wrong lane of 
an intersecting street. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State's petition 
for writ of certiorari should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this ^£* day of February, 1990, 
ME^VIN Cj. WILSON 
Davis Coainty At torney 
BRIAN J J NAMBA 
Deputy/Davis County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Darwin C, 
Hansen, Attorney for Defendant, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City UT 
84101, this day of February, 1990. 
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case, however, we believe the issue of prejudice 
relative to the gun custody issue was sufficiently 
problematic to merit analysis. 
S. For example, defendant claims his counsel should 
have argued he was incompetent to stand trial or 
lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent to 
commit the crimes. Testimony at defendant's sent-
encing hearing, however, by Dr. Alma Carlisle, a 
Utah State Prison psychologist, negated those the-
ories. Exclusion of the theories was, therefore, a 
legitimate trial strategy. 
Gteat 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Jadge: 
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of 
negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation <tt Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 
(1978). We reverse the conviction, 
FACTS 
Defendant David R/Warden, Jr., is a lice-
nsed and board-certified physician who 
began practicing family medkinc in Kaysvflk, 
Utah, in 1968. As part of his practice, defen-
dant provides obstetrical care, and estimates 
that he has attended approximately 2500 
births, 300 of which have been home delive-
ries. 
In September 1986, defendant was visited far 
his office by Joanne Young, who consulted 
defendant because she was pregnant out-of-
wedlock and wanted to have her baby at 
home. Joanne testified that she was embarra-
ssed about her pregnancy and 'didn't want to 
have to go to the hospital and have people 
know/ She also expressed a desire to keep the 
expenses of birth to a minimum. Defendant 
evaluated her for home delivery, considering 
tpe risks of her pregnancy, the proximity of 
hospital facilities, and the availability of 
family support to care for the infant and 
pother after birth. Defendant determined that 
Joanne's pregnancy was low risk and that 
medical facilities were nearby. He also learned 
tjiat Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the 
primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy had 
given birth at home to four of her seven chil-
dren. Based on -this evaluation, defendant 
decided that Joanne was a suitable candidate 
ft>r home delivery and agreed to attend the 
birth. He also made arrangements to obtain 
Joanne's medical records from her previous 
doctor, and on the basis of that information 
apd his own examination, calculated her deli-
very date to be in early December. 
On the morning of November 7, Joanne 
began experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ivy called 
defendant, who was in Salt Lake City at the 
tjme. Defendant expressed concern that labor 
was beginning and advised Ivy to confine 
joanne to bed and to contact him immediately 
if the bleeding became heavier or if strong 
contractions began. That afternoon, Ivy called 
defendant again and told him that the bleeding 
b*d stopped. She also told him that she had 
spoken with the father of the child and that he 
had told her that conception had occurred* 
month earlier than originally believed. Defe* 
ndant testified that this information led him to 
think that the labor was not premature, and 
he advised her to call again as labor conti-
nued. Ivy did so that evening, repenting that 
joanne was having occasional contractions. 
Defendant told her to call back when thai 
contractions were three to five minutes apart. 
At about 10:15 p.m., Ivy informed defendant 
that the final stage of labor had begun. Def-
endant arrived at the house fifteen minutes 
lgter. 
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breecn mrtn 
to * male infant which appeared to be healthy, 
but weighed only an estimated four to five 
pounds. The baby exhibited some respiratory 
distress which defendant attributed to prema-
turity. Defendant testified that he suggested 
hospitalization of the infant to Ivy, bat that 
Ivy was concerned because there was no health 
insurance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied 
that she ever discussed with defendant hospi-
talization of the infant) Defendant instructed 
ivy how to position the infant to relieve some" 
of the respiratory distress and showed Joanne 
bow to nurse the baby. He also instructed Ivy 
tp keep the child warm and to monitor the 
baby's temperature, color, and brouhing* 
After instructing Ivy to call him if there were 
any changes in the baby's condition, defen-
dant left at about 11 ;30 p.m. 
During the night. Ivy moved Joanne and the 
baby into a warmer room. Ivy noticed that tin 
child's hands and feet were 'very blue/ bui 
did not call defendant. At 8:00 a.m., the babj 
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appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy att-
empted to resuscitate him for about twenty 
minutes, and apparently the infant responded. 
She thai called defendant's office, but was 
told he was at home. When Ivy called defen-
dant's home, his wife advised her he was not 
there, but would be in his office by 9:30 a.m. 
In neither call did she identify herself, leave a 
message, nor report that there was any emer-
gency. She apparently was aware defendant 
was not inaccessible in such a situation, but 
did not make further attempts to reach him. 
She did not take the infant to the hospital or 
notify emergency services. She testified that in 
England, her native home, "you would have 
had to have g doctor's permission to have 
called an ambulance." 
At about 8:30 *JXL, Ivy called a friend but 
did not tell her that the child was having dif-
ficulty breathing. She also called her clerg-
yman, but did not advise him until 9:30 or 
10:00 a.m. that the baby was having respira-
tory difficulty. The clergyman called a local 
pediatrician, who arrived at the Youngs' home 
at about 10:30 a,m. only to find the infant 
'lifeless.* The baby was taken to a hospital, 
but was pronounced dead shortly after arrival. 
A postmortem examination revealed that the 
infant was born approximately six to seven 
weeks premature and had died from respira-
tory distress caused by prematurity of the 
lungs (hyaline membrane disease). Defendant 
subsequently was charged with one count of 
negligent homicide. 
An initial jury trial ended In a mistrial prior 
to the rendition of a verdict. A second jury 
trial was held February 22-26, 1988, and 
defendant was convicted as charged. Defen-
dant's motions to arrest judgment and for a 
new trial were denied. 
ISSUES 
Defendant raises essentially two issues on 
appeal, arguing, for a reversal of his convic-
tion. He first claims that the State's expert 
witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the 
applicable,medical standard of care. Second, 
he argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to establish that his conduct deviated signifi-
cantly from the applicable standard of care 
and that there was a causal connection 
between his conduct and the baby's death. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Conduct constituting the crime of negligent 
homicide occurs when an 'actor, acting with 
criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another.' Utah Code Ann. $76-5-206(1) 
(1978). The culpable mental state for criminal 
negligence requires 'only that a defendant 
'ought to be aware of a substantial and unj-
ustifiable risk' of death.* StMte v. Standiford, 
769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah 
Code Aim. §76-2-103(4) (1978)); see also 1 
C Torda, Wharton's Criminal Law §168 
(14th ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1978). Conseq-
uently, negligent homicide involves a defen-
dant's perception of risk and necessarily req-
uires an evaluation of his or her state of mind. 
State v. Wessendorf, Til P.2d 523, 525-26 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Whether a defendant 
negligently fails to perceive the risk is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. See State v. Howard, 
597 P.2d 878, 881 .(Utah 1979). However, the 
risk of death "must be of such a degree that 
an ordinary person would not ... fail to reco-
gnize i t / State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 
(Utah 1983). 
Because the "failure to perceive die risk 
constitutes a ajoss deviation from the reaso-
nable man standard," ordinary negligence 
adequate in the civil law is insufficient to 
constitute criminal negligence. State y* 
Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1979); see 
also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267; 2 C. Tofda, 
Wharton's Criminal Law §168 (terms such at 
"criminal negligence" are intended to connote 
deviations from reasonableness significantly 
greater in degree than ordinary negligence). 
Thus, "(mlere inattention or mistake in judg-
ment resulting even in death of another is noi 
criminal unless the quality of the act makes Mt 
so." People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d 
433,8CaLRptr.863.868(1960). 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Defendant contends thai expert testimony 
was required in this case to establish the 
"standard of care," but that the State's 
medical experts were not qualified to testify. 
On the other hand, the State argues that 
expert medical testimony was not required, 
and that it needed only to present 'competent' 
evidence to show the nature and degree of risk 
and the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint." The State correctly obs-
erves that the "standard of care* in section 76-
2-103(4) refers to the actor's mental state, i s 
opposed to medical malpractice cases in which 
expert medical testunony is required to show 
the applicable standard of medical care. See, 
e.g., Chadwkk y. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 
(Utah C t App. 1988), It is also true that 
expert testimony i$ not required to prove the 
mental state of a criminal defendant accused 
of homidde. See State v. Nicholson. 585 P.2d 
60,63 (Utah 1978). 
We conclude, however, that expert testi-
mony was required in this case since such 
testimony was necessary to establish the nature 
and degree of risk. Section 76-5-206(1) 
requires the State to prove beyond a reason* 
able doubt that defendant's judgment was 
criminally deficient because he failed to perc-
liTAH AnVlNTV MPrtBTfi 
eive a substantial risk that death could occur. | 
Without an understanding of the nature and 
degree of risk, the jury could not determine 
whether the risk was substantial, and if so, 
whether defendant's failure to perceive it was 
grossly negligent. Unless the risk is one within 
the common knowledge and experience of 
laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury could 
make an informed determination of culpabi-
lity.2 We believe that expert testimony is req-
uired where criminal negligence is alleged and 
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the 
ken of the average layperson. See, e.g., 
Ketchum v. Ward, All F. Supp. 934 
(W.D.N.Y. 1976) (State's, use of expert 
medical testimony at trial supplied sufficient 
evidence of criminal negligence for negligent 
homicide conviction iri death of mother on 
whom physician had performed legal abor-
tion). 
Defendant argues that the State's expert 
medical witnesses did not qualify as experts 
because they do not attend home deliveries. 
The witnesses included two obstetrician/ 
gynecologists, a pediatrician, and a neonatol-
ogist. Citing the medical malpractice case of 
Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 
(Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school of 
medicine is not competent to testify as an 
expert against the practitioner of another 
school), defendant argues that the State's 
doctors were not qualified to testify because 
they were of a different school of medicine I 
tiinff defendant* I 
The qualification of an expert witness it a 
matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 
(Utah 1986). There was evidence in the record 
that there is no board certification or recogn-
ized medical specialty in home delivery. There 
was also evidence that the medical principles 
applicable to the delivery of babies are appli-
cable whether a birth occurs at home or in a 
hospital. In view of the record evidence, the 
trial court was within its discretion to qualify 
the State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf. \ 
Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and 
procedures of general plastic surgeon were 
shown to be identical to those of specialized 
plastic surgeon, one may testify against the 
other); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., I 
711 PJd 250, 253 (Utah 1985) (nothing prec-
ludes testimony from expert in another trade if I 
the standard is the same for. both). 'The crit-
ical factor in determining the competency of I 
an expert is whether that expert has knowledge I 
that can assist the trier of fact in resolving-the I 
issues before i t ' Id. at 253; see also/Qtah R. 
Evid. 702. We conclude that the trial court I 
committed no abuse of discretion in allowing [ 
the State's experts to testify. f 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that the evidence prese-
nted was insufficient to establish guilt beyond 
Warden cora#co 
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a reasonable doubt. To convict a person of 
violating section 76-5-206(1), the State must 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, both 
prohibited conduct and a qulpable mental 
state. To establish a culpable mental state, the 
prosecution must present evidence that defe-
ndant was unaware of a substantial and unj-
ustifiable risk of death, but should have been 
so aware. 
We review defendant's claim under a stan-
dard that does not permit us to substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury in a criminal 
trial. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Rather, 
we review the evidence and all inf-
erences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improb-
able that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Hopkins, 
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 59,60 (1989). 
Defendant testified at trial that the grand-
parents weighed the newborn baby and dete-
rmined it to be about five pounds. Defendant 
also said he believed the baby to be two to 
three weeks premature. Defendant was aware 
that the baby was having 'grunting respirat-
ions / which he said was a sign of early resp-
iratory distress syndrome. Defendant positi-
oned the baby in such a way that the labored 
breathing was relieved. He further testified 
that the severity of the respiratory distress did 
not indicate a need for hospitalization. He 
said that he informed Ivy that the baby waa 
premature and had difficulty in breathing, but 
that the baby was then stable. He instructed 
Ivy to call him if there was any change and 
admitted that he was depending on Ivy to 
carefully watch the infant Before leaving the 
Young residence, defendant noted that the 
respiratory difficulty had subsided. He stated, 
"The baby was respiring well, the baby waa 
stffl awake and alert and muscle tone was still 
good / He also said, 
I was impressed that the baby had 
already shown some signs of respi-
ratory distress syndrome, but under 
similar circumstances in the past, t 
have left babies at bome^ having 
instructed the mother'on how. to 
nurse, having instructed the mother 
to keep the baby warm and there-
fore I felt I could leave, confident 
that grandma would call me, conf-
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ident that if there were any progr-
ession of symptoms that I would be 
called. 
Defendant later testified that of 300 home 
births he had attended, approximately ten of 
those babies had been premature. Eight of 
those had had respiratory distress, but defen-
dant said that he had hospitalized only three 
of those eight. In the case of this infant, def-
endant testified that "in my experience and the 
judgment that I applied at the time based on 
experience with babies who are even smaller 
than this delivered at home, they can in many 
cases get along very, very well.... • 
The State's expert medical witnesses testi-
fied that although the mother and baby 
"would do better" in a hospital, defendant's 
evaluation of the infant's well-being would 
indicate that the baby's vital signs were 
"acceptable." They conceded that the infant 
may have survived had he been hospitalized up 
to ten hours after birth, but believed that 
leaving the baby at home was "bad judgment" 
on defendant's part.1 
The State's neonatologist testified that 
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive 
disease. He also indicated that a baby in the 
condition of the deceased is typically "at high 
risk for medical and surgical problems." As 
far as mortality for an infant with the disease, 
however, he stated that the failure to provide 
therapy would only place the probability of 
death at Ave to fifteen percent. He later stated 
upon cross-examination that statistically only 
two percent of babies die from untreated 
hyaline membrane disease. He further said, "I 
guess the message is it's very unusual and rare 
to lose a baby at this gestation and this birth 
weight from hyaline membrane disease." 
Asked whether it would be outside the 
medical standard of care to have the family of 
a home-delivered newborn to monitor any 
changes in the baby's condition, the neonat-
ologist believed it was, but conceded that 
other * competent physicians would disagree 
with him. This response merely reinforces our 
conclusion that his testimony, as well 4k that 
of the other experts for the State, must be 
construed in light of the fact that home deli-
very, though legal, is not a widespread prac-
tice by doctors in Utah. The State's experts 
testified that the medical community in this 
state does not teach or train physicians for 
home delivery and generally recommends 
against it. 
We are convinced that even looking at the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, that evidence was "sufficiently inco-
nclusive" to establish that there was a substa-
ntial and unjustifiable risk of death such that 
defendant should have been aware of it. Thus, 
reasonable minds could examine the evidence 
presented and entertain "a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." See Booker, 709 
P.2dat345. 
Since we conclude that the evidence failed to 
establish criminal negligence, we need not 
reach the issue whether defendant's acts or 
omissions were the legal cause of death. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed. 
Russell W. Bench. Judge 
I CONCUR: 
J, Robert Bullock, Judge 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting 
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78.3-2400 (Supp. 1989). 
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to the 
subjective intent of the defendant, i.e., 'the actor's 
viewpoint,9 which need not be accepted by the court 
and which is ultimately a determination for the jury. 
3. Our research has revealed very few cases In which 
licensed physicians have been charged with negligent 
homicide. In many of those cases where such a 
charge has been brought, albeit under differing 
statutes, the courts have held thru no criminal liab-
ility attaches when death results from an error of 
judgment. See gencnOy Annotation* Homicide 
Predated on Improper Treatment of Disease or 
Injury, 45 AJLRJd 114(1972). 
GREENWOOD, Judge: ( comniag art 
dissenting} 
I concur in Judge Bench's opinion concer-
ning expert testimony, but dissent from the 
opinion's conclusion that there was not suff-
icient evidence to sustain the jury's conviction 
of negligent homicide/ The majority opinion 
correctly states the necessary quantum of evi-
dence for negligent homicide as being where 
the defendant should have been aware of a 
substantial and unjustified risk of death, but 
was not. State v. Wcssotdorf, 77? P*2d 523, 
525 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Also, the risk must 
be such that an ordinary person would not, 
cfisregard or fail to recognize it. State r.Dyer, 
67! P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). Therefore, in 
this case, the State was required to convince 
the jury that there was a substantial and unj-
ustified risk that the Infant would die if he did 
not receive medical care in a hospital-type 
setting; that defendant was unaware that the 
risk existed; and that an ordinary person in 
defendant's position would have recognized 
that risk. Our task as an appellate court, is to 
determine if the evidence presented, when 
viewed favorably to the jury verdict, *is suff-
iciently inconclusive or Inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant commit 
tied the crime of which he was convicted/ State 
v. Booker, 109 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Peine. €59 PM 443. 
444(1983)), 
My assessment of the evidence supporting 
the jury verdict IB as foUowt: defendant was a 
licensed physician who had maintained a 
family practice since 1968, including obstetr-
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ical care; defendant assumed responsibility for 
the infant's physical well-being by agreeing 
to deliver it at home; defendant did not insist 
on examining the mother when she reported 
vaginal bleeding to determine if premature 
birth was likely or if so, what precautions 
should be taken to minimize the likelihood of 
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the 
infant after birth as having Respiratory Dist-
ress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to 
position the infant in a way which relieved the 
symptoms but would not allevihte the condi-
tion itself; defendant minimised the serious-
ness of the infant's condition to Ivy and 
Joanne; three of the ten children he had deli-
vered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant 
could die from the disease and that the disease 
was progressive; defendant could not himself 
admit the infant into a hospital because he 
lacked malpractice insurance, so would have 
to call another physician or have the infant 
admitted through an emergency room facility; 
Ivy testified that defendant only told her to 
watch the infant for changes in his tempera-
ture, color and respiration, without advising 
her as to the degree of change which might 
indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or 
Joanne that death could result from the 
disease; and defendant left the infant in the 
care of laypersons. 
There was other, conflicting evidence which 
would indicate that defendant should not have 
been aware that a substantial risk existed. 
However, the existence of conflicting evidence, 
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury 
verdict. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424-
25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The jury has been 
through the arduous task of listening to and 
assessing the evidence presented in this most 
difficult case, and I do not think that we 
should appropriately substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was 
based on what defendant knew or the jury 
believed he knew at the time, and its assess-
ment that given that knowledge he should 
have known the risks. I do not find the evid-
ence 'sufficiently inconclusive/ as do my 
colleagues, to justify conviction. I would 
conclude that the record, while heatedly con-
troverted, contains sufficient evidence for the 
jury to conclude that defendant should, have 
been aware that a substantial and unjustified 
risk of death existed, and to convict defendant 
of negligent homicide as a result. 
Pamela T. Greenwood* Judge 
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122 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-
Respondent, 
• • 
Roland W. REICHERT, 
Defendant, Respondent, and Cross-
Appellant. 
No.880246-CA 
FILED: November 24,1989 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
ATTORNEYS: 
Bryce E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
E.H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and 
Greenwood. tpOPINION 
BILLINGS, lodge: 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. ("Regional') 
appeals from a jury verdict awarding it 
$792.18 in damages as a result of cross-
appellant Roland Reichert's ("Mr. Reichert*) 
breach of a non-competition agreement with 
Regional, his former employer. Regional also 
appeals the trial court's reduction of its atto-
rney fees which Regional claims were provided 
for by the parties' written contract and reas-
onably incurred in prosecuting this action. 
Mr. Reichert cross-appeals the court's 
denial of his attempt to amend his counterc-
laim to add a claim for unpaid commissions 
and salary. We reverse and remand in. part, 
and affirm in part. 
Singe the late 1950s, Edward and Helen 
Kiholm have operated a small family business 
which acted as a manufacturer's representative 
in designated territories of the mountain west. 
The business earned commissions from its 
principal manufacturers by selling their goods 
to retailers. 
In 1977, the Kiholms hired Mr. Reichert as 
an independent contractor to handle outside 
sales. If the relationship was satisfactory, the 
Kiholms intended to retire in ten years with 
Mr. Reichert taking over the business* Mr. 
Reichert worked for the Kiholms until 1978 
when the business was incorporated as Regi-
onal. 
In 1979, Mr. Reichert entered into a written 
employment contract with Regional. The 
employment contract contains a non-
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OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
David R. Warden, Jr., M.D., 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER 
Case No. 880575-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Petition for 
Rehearing be denied• 
Dated this j^2_T3ay of January 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
bonan, Clerk 
